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DOES LAND ABUNDANCE EXPLAIN AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS?
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. I show that abundant land and scarce labor shaped African institutions before
colonial rule. I test a model in which exogenous land quality and endogenous population
determine the existence of land rights and slavery. I use cross-sectional data on a global
sample of societies to demonstrate that, as in the model, land rights occurred where land
quality was high and where population density was greatest. Slavery existed where land
was good and population density was intermediate. The model can explain institutional
differences across regions, but not within regions. I present suggestive evidence that this
is due to institutional spillovers.
This version: March 6, 2012
1. INTRODUCTION
The “land abundance” view of African history accounts for the economic institutions
that existed on the continent before colonial rule (Austin, 2008a; Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe,
1995). It holds that, since land was freely available, land had no price, and rights to
land were ill-defined. Because cultivators would not become free workers, coerced and
household labor substituted for wage employment. Lagerlo¨f’s (2010) model of “slavery
and other property rights” mirrors these arguments. In this paper, I use cross-sectional
data on a sample of societies to test this view. I show that land rights and slavery existed
in those regions predicted by the model, but that institutional spillovers prevent the
model from predicting differences within broad geographic regions.
Although I am motivated by a literature that focuses on Africa, the “land abundance”
view attempts to explain land rights and slavery globally. The Lagerlo¨f (2010) model
need not apply only to Africa. I, then, test the model using a global sample. Land tenure
and slavery matter today. Land tenure shapes investment incentives (Goldstein and
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Udry, 2008), labor-supply (Field, 2007), and violence (Andre and Platteau, 1998). Nunn
(2008a) shows that those African countries that exported the most slaves are compara-
tively poor today. Within the Americas, legacies of slavery explain differences in income
across countries and U.S. counties (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn, 2008b), as well
as long term racial gaps in education and income (Miller, 2011; Sacerdote, 2005).
The “land abundance” view of African history argues that the continent’s geography
has given it an abundance of land relative to labor. I add, then, to our understand-
ing of the geographic origins of institutions. Geographic features such as continental
orientation, ruggedness, settler mortality, and suitability for specific crops predict con-
temporary institutional differences across countries (Easterly and Levine, 2003; Enger-
man and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn and Puga, 2012). The crucial geographic variables in
the Lagerlo¨f (2010) model are land quality and population density. Michalopoulos et al.
(2010) and Michalopoulos (2011) have shown that heterogeneity in land quality predicts
both ethnic fragmentation and the emergence of Islam. Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue
that pre-colonial population densities determined the colonial institutions imposed by
Europeans. I highlight institutional consequences of these two variables that have been
neglected in the literature.
In the Lagerlo¨f (2010) model, exogenous land quality increases the returns to landown-
ership, compensates for the inefficiencies of slavery, and sustains greater population in
the steady state. Endogenously evolving population responds to the geographic and in-
stitutional environments. It shapes the relative values of land and labor and the relative
costs of free and forced workers. I test this model using a cross-section of global soci-
eties from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. I find that the model correctly predicts
that land rights and slavery were found in those societies that occupied the best land,
and that greater population densities were correlated with rights over land. Slavery was
present when population densities were intermediate, as in the model. While the model
predicts differences across regions, it is not capable of predicting differences within re-
gions.
In Section 2, I outline the literature in African history on how land abundance has
shaped economic institutions. I present the basic features of the model and its testable
implications. In Section 3, I describe the data used and lay out the econometric speci-
fications. In Section 4, I report the results of these tests. In Section 5, I show that these
results are robust to different measures of the institutional outcomes, alternative prox-
ies for land quality and historical population density, and the possible endogeneity of
land quality. I also argue that this theory of land rights and slavery better explains the
data than some prominent alternatives, including ecological risk as a cause of com-
mon property, and suitability for specific crops as a predictor of slavery. In Section 6, I
demonstrate that the model is unable to predict differences within regions, and present
evidence that this is due to spatial correlation in institutional outcomes. In Section, 7 I
conclude.
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2. THE LAND ABUNDANCE VIEW OF AFRICAN HISTORY
2.1. Literature. A first-order task in African history is explaining the continent’s long-
run differences from the rest of the world. The starting point of the land abundance view
is Africa’s distinctive settlement pattern. Herbst (2000, p. 16) estimates the population
density of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1900 at 4.4 persons per Sq. Km, contrasted with 38.2 for
South Asia, 45.6 for China, and 62.9 for Europe.1 Explanations of low African population
densities stress geographic factors, the disease environment, and historical factors such
as the slave trades (Mahadi and Inikori, 1987, p. 63-64). This sparse settlement, Hopkins
(1973, p. 23-27) argues, shaped institutions, because Africans “measured wealth and
power in men rather than in acres.” Here, I outline the implications for land rights and
slavery.
Austin (2009, p. 33) argues that African land was often “easily and cheaply accessi-
ble in institutional terms”; pre-colonial authorities were eager to attract “more people
with whom to subdue nature and, if necessary, their neighbors,” so that strangers could
generally acquire land indefinitely for token payments. Citizens were given land virtu-
ally freely. Austin (2008a, p. 591-594) notes that ‘islands’ of intensive agriculture have
existed in Africa where insecurity has created artificial land scarcity and in specific lo-
cations of exceptional value. Against these views, Spear (1997, p. 154-157) argues that
population density cannot explain individual cases. Berry (1988), similarly, has noted
that inheritance rules, tenancy contracts, and labor arrangements prevent the evolu-
tion of individualized land tenure. Thornton (1992, p. 75-76) suggests that ownership of
land results from legal claims, not population pressure.
For Austin (2008a, p. 606-610), scarcity of labor explains forced labor. He builds on
Nieboer (1900) and Domar (1970), who argue that coercion is cheaper than paying a
wage when labor is scarce and wages high. Writers such as Kopytoff and Miers (1977,
p. 68-69), Lovejoy (1978, p. 349), or Miers and Klein (1998, p. 4-5) object that slaves were
employed in non-economic uses and distributed by non-market means. Kopytoff (1987,
p. 46) and Goody (1980, p. 26-31) add that dependents must be “seduced” rather than
coerced, so slavery can only exist in complex societies and states with “well-developed
systems of compulsion.”
I clarify this literature and test its claims. With the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model as a rea-
sonable formalization, the “land abundance” view can be reconciled with some of its
criticisms. While high wages resulting from population density explain the preference
for slavery over free labor under certain conditions in the model, there are also condi-
tions under which population is too sparse for slavery to be worthwhile, corresponding
with the less complex societies in Africa that have poorly developed systems of com-
pulsion. I show that the institutional effects of population and agricultural productivity
follow regular patterns, and that the presence of slavery is systematically related to the
economic value of slaves and to population.
1His estimate for North Africa is 9.4 persons per Sq. Km.
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2.2. Model. I test the model of “slavery and other property rights” from Lagerlo¨f (2009).
This is for two reasons. First, his model echoes the arguments made by historians, mak-
ing explicit the testable implications of their views. Greater population lowers average
product, which is shared equally in an egalitarian regime. This creates incentives to cre-
ate rights over land. Similarly, the relative costs of free labor and slavery are determined
by the competitive wage, which is itself a function of population size. If population
pressure increases labor supply and depresses the wage, free labor becomes profitable
relative to keeping slaves.
Second, his model extends the “land abundance” view. If population is sufficiently
low, slavery will not exist, since population pressure has not adequately depressed the
returns to an egalitarian sharing of output while the opportunity costs of wasting labor
on coercion remain high. This reconciles the land abundance view with the critiques of
Kopytoff and Goody. In addition, the quality of land determines both the relative prof-
itability of institutional regimes for a given population and the level of population that
can be supported. This variable has been neglected by the Africanist literature. Lagerlo¨f
(2009) makes the concept of “land abundance” more precise; it is the availability of cul-
tivable land relative to both population and productivity that matters. Here, I briefly
sketch the basic elements of the model and state its testable implications.
The model takes a society in period t with a population Pt of non-elite agents and a
comparatively small elite that does not work. The elite chooses institutions. Output Yt
depends on land M , land-augmenting productivity A˜t, and the labor used Lt:
Yt = (MA˜t)
αL1−αt ≡ Aαt L1−αt .(1)
At the beginning of each period, the elite chooses between three regimes based on
which one yields them the greatest profits piit, where i denotes one of three institutional
regimes. The first is egalitarianism. Under this arrangement, there are no land rights or
slavery. The elite and the non-elite each receive average product, and so:
piEt =
(At
Pt
)α
.(2)
The second possible outcome is slavery. Here, the elite enclose the entire land, creat-
ing rights over it. They enslave St slaves from the population, paying them only subsis-
tence income c¯. Each slave requires γ guards, who are also paid c¯, and so the elite payoff
is:
piSt = max
St≤Pt/(1+γ)
{Aαt S1−αt − (1 + γ)c¯St}.(3)
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The third possible outcome is free labor. Again, the elite enclose the entire land. Now,
however, they hire members of the population at a competitive wagewt, which depends
on Pt. The elite’s payoff is:
piFt = max
Lt≥0
{Aαt L1−αt − wtLt}.(4)
Lagerlo¨f (2009) shows that the state space in At and Pt can be divided into three sets:
SE, in which the elite prefer egalitarianism; SS, in which they prefer slavery, and; SS,
in which they prefer free labor. The boundaries of these regions are defined by three
functions of Pt: Ψ(Pt), Ω(Pt), and Φ(Pt). These are depicted in Figure 1.
The slavery region, SS, is where At ≥ max{Ψ(Pt),Ω(Pt)} and Pt > (1 + γ)1−α. At ≥
Ψ(Pt) implies that population is still sufficiently low that wt is high relative to the cost of
keeping slaves. At ≥ Ω(Pt) implies that population is sufficiently dense that the average
product under egalitarianism has fallen. High productivity also ensures the elite is will-
ing to waste some labor on guarding slaves in order to take a greater share of output for
themselves. The opportunity cost of these guards is particularly high when population
is very low. This explains both the slope of Ω(Pt) and the condition that Pt > (1 + γ)1−α.
SF is the free labor region, in which Φ(Pt) ≤ At ≤ Ψ(Pt) and Pt > 1/α. Pt > 1/α en-
sures that population is great enough that average product has fallen, making enclosure
worthwhile. At ≤ Ψ(Pt) occurs when population growth pushes down wages relative to
the costs of keeping slaves. The condition that Φ(Pt) ≤ At is of less interest, driven by
an assumption that the wage is bounded below by c¯. SE occurs in the remainder of the
(At, Pt) space, where average product and the counterfactual wage are both relatively
high.
The model has dynamics that are Malthusian and Boserupian. They are Malthusian
in that fertility is increasing in income. Two upward-sloping zero population growth
lines exist – one under slavery and one under both egalitarianism and free labor. To the
left of these, income is high and population is growing. To the right, income is low and
population is falling. These are shown in Figure 1 as LE/F (Pt) and LS(Pt).
The dynamics are Boserupian in that agricultural technology in period t + 1 has an
intercept of A¯ and depends positively on both At and Pt. Lagerlo¨f (2009) takes A¯ as
the “minimum level of agricultural technology,” and I interpret it as exogenous land
quality. The result is an upward-sloping zero-technological-growth line LA(Pt). Above
this, productivity degrades, while below this it improves. This is also shown in Figure 1.
A steady state exists where either LE/F (Pt) or LS(Pt) intersects LA(Pt). Figure 1 depicts
a steady state in the free labor region.
2.3. Tests. What are the testable implications of this model and, by extension, the land
abundance view? First, land quality A¯ should positively predict the existence of land
rights and slavery. Land rights do not exist under egalitarianism, and if A¯ is too low, it
is impossible to support a steady state under either regime. Similarly, A¯ must be high in
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order for a steady state to exist with slavery. However, since larger values of A¯ can sup-
port steady states in both the slavery and free labor regions, the relationship between A¯
and slavery is expected to be weaker than for land rights. Second, population density,
which I take as corresponding to Pt in the model, will predict land rights and slavery.
While this is an endogenous variable, these are still correlations implied by the model
and part of its implications. For land rights to exist, Pt must be greater than the cutoffs
implied by Ω(Pt), 1/α, and Φ(Pt). For slavery to exist, Pt must be great enough that en-
closure of land is worthwhile and the opportunity costs of coercion are not too high, but
also sparse enough that wages are not too low. It must be between the cutoffs implied by
Ω(Pt) and Ψ(Pt). It is the implied relationships between land quality, population density,
land rights, and slavery that I test in assessing the “land abundance” view.
2.4. Other implications. I use land quality A¯ and population Pt to test the land abun-
dance view. There are seven additional parameters in the model. I do not use these
to derive additional tests. Three parameters, β, q and α, do not yield clear predictions
for the existence of land rights or slavery. The remaining parameters, γ, D, θ and c¯,
do give clear predictions (see the web appendix), but are not directly observed in ge-
ographic data. The geographic controls I am able use will affect several parameters at
once. Ruggedness, for example, may increase the cost of guarding slaves (γ) through
the mechanisms identified by Nunn and Puga (2012), but will also impact technological
parameters (θ, D, and α) directly, since feasible agricultural systems differ between flat
and rugged areas.
3. DATA AND SPECIFICATIONS
In this section, I outline how I test the predictions of the model. I use a cross section of
data on 1,205 societies. In Section 3.1, I detail the econometric specifications. In Section
3.2, I describe the sources of data on institutions, the proxies for the variables A¯ and Pt
in the model, and the additional controls that I include.
3.1. Specifications. The first prediction of the model is that raising A¯ will make it pos-
sible for steady states to exist with land rights or slavery. I test this by estimating:
yi = α + βAAi + x
′
iγ + i,(5)
where yi is an outcome of interest for soceity i,Ai is a proxy for land quality (analogous
to A¯ in the model), xi is a vector of geographical controls, and i is random error. (5)
is estimated as a probit with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. I expect that
βA > 0 when yi is an indicator for land rights or slavery.
The second implication of the model is that land rights exist at higher levels of Pt,
while slavery exists at intermediate levels of Pt. I test these by estimating:
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yi = α + βp ln(1 + pi) + x
′
iγ + i,(6)
and
yi = α + βp1 ln(1 + pi) + βp2(ln(1 + pi))
2 + x′iγ + i,(7)
where (abusing notation) yi, xi, and i are defined as in (5). pi is population density, the
proxy used for Pt. The specific functional form is chosen because slavery peaks towards
the left hand side of the population distribution. A strictly logarithmic specification
gives undue influence to very sparsely settled societies. These are also estimated as
probit models. I expect that βp > 0, βp1 > 0, and βp2 < 0. I estimate equations with log
population density and land quality separately, since the correlation between the two
(ρ = 0.36) inhibits joint tests. I do not report results of the land rights regression with
the quadratic term, since an inverse-U relationship is not anticipated by the model. If I
do estimate the land rights equation with the quadratic term, that term not statistically
significant.
3.2. Data. I use two types of data to test the ability of the model to explain institutions.
Details of the variables used and their sources are in the web appendix. The first type
of data covers institutions, and is taken from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. This
is a database of 1,267 societies from around the world. It contains categorical variables
describing several institutional and cultural features of these societies, usually at the
time of first contact with Europeans. From this sample, I remove 2 duplicate observa-
tions (the Chilcotin and Tokelau), 8 societies from before 1500 (Ancient Egypt, Aryans,
Babylonia, Romans, Icelander, Uzbeg, Khmer, Hebrews), and 52 for which land quality
information is missing (mostly small Pacific islands). This leaves a base sample of 1,205
societies. 801 of these have data on land rights, 1,040 on slavery.
I construct binary variables for whether land rights or slavery exist. Summary statis-
tics are given in Table 1. For each society, I observe land rights and slavery at the same
point in time. I map these variables in Figure 2. Why use this data? The principal justifi-
cation is availability. This is the only source of cross-cultural information on land rights
and slavery that has global scope. In addition, the variables were compiled by the same
author, and so are internally consistent.
The second type of data includes features of the natural environment. I join these
to the Ethnographic Atlas using one of five map sources. First, I join African societies
to ethnic groups mapped by Murdock (1959). Second, I merge First Nations groups in
the United States and Canada with maps from the Handbook of North American In-
dians (Heizer and Sturtevant, 1978).2 Third, I join ethnic groups from the rest of the
2These were digitized for the United States by Dippel (2010) and for Canada by myself.
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world to Global Mapping International’s (GMI) detailed World Language Mapping Sys-
tem. Fourth, if no match can be found in the GMI map, I use the less detailed Geo-
Referencing Ethnic Groups (GREG) map of Weidmann et al. (2010). Finally, if no match
can be found in any of these, I match groups with modern administrative boundaries.
For example, the Nunivak are matched to Nunivak Island.
I use the historical maps first in order to reduce migration-induced errors. The Mur-
dock (1959) and Heizer and Sturtevant (1978) maps show ethnic groups prior to Euro-
pean contact. Historical maps are not available for Asia or Latin America, necessitating
use of the more modern GMI and GREG maps. Of 1,267 societies, 100 were matched to a
different group indicated in the same location while 76 were matched to a larger group
of which they form a smaller part (such as the Efik to the Ibibio). A full table of matches
and a map of the assembled polygons are given in the web appendix.3
Once these matches are formed, I join geographic raster data to them by taking the
average of the raster points within an ethnic group’s territory. Two of these controls are
of particular importance – land quality and population density.
3.2.1. Land quality. To measure land quality, I re-scale Fischer et al.’s (2002) index of
climate, soil and terrain slope constrains on rainfed agriculture so that it is a standard
normal variable between 0 and 1. Larger values of the re-scaled variable indicate better
land. This is a proxy for A¯ in the model.
Constraints were measured as part of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global
Agro-Ecological Zones (FAO-GAEZ) project.4 This measure is not particular to any spe-
cific crop or technology. It is a non-additive combination of:
(1) Climate constraints: Coldness constraints are “moderate” if there are fewer than
180 days with an average temperature below 5◦C, and “severe” if there are fewer
than 120. Aridity constraints are moderate if there are fewer than 120 days with
an average temperature below 5◦C during which moisture conditions are ade-
quate to permit crop growth. They are severe if there are fewer than 60 such
days.
(2) Soil constraints: Soil depth, fertility, drainage, texture and chemical constraints
are considered. “Medium” and “shallow” depth are moderate and severe con-
straints, respectively. “Medium” and “low” fertility are treated similarly as mod-
erate and severe constraints. “Poor” drainage is a severe constraint. Sandy and
3The Ethnographic Atlas gives co-ordinates for each society. All but 46 of these societies are within 500
km of the centroid of the polygon to which they are joined. Of these discrepancies, 22 are due to obvious
errors in the Ethnographic Atlas. For example, the Ethnographic Atlas gives the Koreans a coordinate that
is in Tibet. 14 are groups that cover diffuse areas, making it difficult to assign them a meaningful coordi-
nate. These include Russians and the Eastern Cree. 8 are given coordinates in the Ethnographic Atlas that
differ from their locations in the other maps for no obvious reason. The remaining two are idiosyncratic.
The GMI map divides the Botocudos into 3 polygons. Two of are in Minas Gerais, as expected, but one is
in Rio Grande do Sul. Second, the polygon that represents the Diegueno in Heizer and Sturtevant (1978)
is truncated at the US border.
4See http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm
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stony soils are severe constraints. Cracking clay is a moderate constraint. Salin-
ity, sodicity, and gypsum are severe constraints.
(3) Terrain slope constraints: Terrain slopes greater than 8% are “moderate” con-
straints, and slopes greater than 30% are “severe.”
An advantage of this constraints-based measure is that it is not based on expected
yields in contemporary agriculture, in which greater crop diversity is available for many
of the societies than at the time they are observed. I do not adjust land quality for the
relative distribution of population within an ethnic group’s territory, since this creates
implausibly high estimates of land quality in the Arctic and Sahara.
3.2.2. Population density. All historical population reconstructions are guesses. One
book on pre-Columbian America is entitled “Numbers from Nowhere” (Henige, 1998).
The principal measure I use for historical population density is from the History Data-
base of the Global Environment (HYDE) version 3.1. This raster data on historical pop-
ulation covers the years 1500, 1600, and every ten years since 1700. For each ethnic
group, I measure historical population density as the average of the raster points within
its territory for the year of observation recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas.5
Details of these estimates are reported by Bouwman et al. (2006), Klein Goldewijk
et al. (2010) and Klein Goldewijk (2005). This data source takes as its base a map of 3441
administrative units from 222 countries. Historical data are then reconstructed on this
base map using Lahmeyer (2004), Helders (2000), Tobler (1995), several local studies,
interpolation, and back projection. The data are reported on a five minute grid.
I plot land quality and population density in Figure 3. I present the percentiles of the
HYDE data and the two principal alternatives, described below, in Table 1. These range
from nearly zero persons per square mile for several groups in the Mato Grosso and
interior Amazon, to over 3,000 persons per square mile for the Okinawans of Japan.6
3.2.3. Alternative measures of population density. Because historical population recon-
struction is unavoidably inexact, it is important to show that the results can be obtained
using alternatives to the HYDE estimates. Because the alternatives are not raster data, I
adopt a simple method to estimate alternative spatially disaggregated historic popula-
tion densities for the societies in my data. I begin with raster data on population density
in 1995 for each of these ethnic groups and combine it with historical estimates for the
broader regions within which these groups are located. Specifically, my alternative esti-
mates take the form:
5For computational reasons, I use data from each 50 year interval, imputing intermediate years exponen-
tially.
6This is an over-estimate due to over-representation of Naha in the original data; administrate records
give a modern density of just above 1,500 persons per square mile. Results are robust to excluding the
Okinawans.
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Historical population density =Population density in 1995×(8)
Regional density at the date of observation
Regional density in 1995
.
This assumes that the relative distribution of population has not changed within re-
gions over time. If the Tamil were 1.37 times as dense as the entirety of the broad region
“India” in 1995, this ratio is pushed back to 1880, the date at which they are observed.
GIS data on population in 1995 is from the FAO-GAEZ. I use two sources of regional es-
timates. The first is McEvedy and Jones (1978). There are well-known problems with
these data (Austin, 2008b; Hopkins, 2009), and so I also use the ARVE Group’s estimates
(Krumhardt, 2010).7
While only a first-order approximation, this approach is preferable to using the un-
weighted regional densities directly. McEvedy and Jones (1978), for example, assign a
single population density to all of Canada. To treat the the Inuit and Ojibwe as equally
dense would be implausible, and would introduce substantial measurement error.8 In
addition to these two main alternatives, I use the 1995 densities directly, the historical
regional densities directly, and for roughly 175 societies I have access to independent es-
timates of their population densities from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS)
of Murdock and White (1969). A derivative of the Ethnographic Atlas, the SCCS contains
a larger number of variables for a smaller sample of societies.
3.2.4. Other controls. I control for other factors that may determine the existence of
land rights and slavery. These are re-scaled as standard normal variables in the regres-
sions. Definitions and sources are outlined in the web appendix. These are the presence
of a major river, distance to the coast, elevation, the percentage of the society’s territory
in which malaria is endemic, precipitation, ruggedness, temperature, date of observa-
tion, absolute latitude, share desert, and an indicator for whether the society derives
most of its income from fishing. These capture variation in the parameters of the model
that I am unable to measure directly, i.e. c¯, β, α, γ, q, D, and θ.
Access to a major river and distance from the coast proxy for water-borne diseases
that affect the cost of fertility (q). They also capture the presence of trade, which affects
the production function (α) through the goods that are traded and through technolog-
ical transfer. These affect the cost of slavery (γ) through what uses exist for slaves and
whether they can be punished by sale for export. Proximity to markets also affects the
7See http://ecospriv4.epfl.ch/index.php?dir=pub/&file=pop_landuse_data.tar.gz
8Ruff (2006) suggests that the Northeast had a population density at contact roughly seven times that of
the Arctic. The method used here assigns the Ojibwe a historic population density of 2.20 per square mile
and the Copper Eskimo a population density of 0.31 per square mile – a roughly seven-fold difference.
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relative utility of fertility (β) through the usefulness of children as substitutes for insur-
ance and savings. Elevation alters q trough the disease environment and α via the range
of available crops and technologies.
Malaria affects q through child mortality and γ via slave mortality. Malaria and abso-
lute latitude both proxy for unobservable features of the tropics that make their institu-
tions systematically different from those in other parts of the world.9 Precipitation de-
termines what crops can be grown, shaping α. Ruggedness, as discussed above, shapes
γ, α and D. Temperature affects the physical cost of effort, and hence γ. In hostile en-
vironments such as deserts, it is more difficult for slaves to flee; γ is lower. Temperature
affects q through nutrition and disease.
The date of observation is a proxy for the degree of European influence and other
institutional contamination that pushes societies towards a Westernized recognition of
land rights and abolition of slavery. If these societies were viewed at another point in
time, there is no guarantee they would possess the same institutions or population den-
sities.
The control for fishing is included with the Pacific Northwest in mind. Here, groups
such as the Haida captured slaves in canoe raids and used them in fishing and hunting
(Donald, 1997). This region is known for having a high surplus and developed material
culture despite the unimportance of agriculture. For groups with easy access to fish,
land quality may be a poor measure of A¯ in the model. This is why Nieboer (1900) for-
mulated his view in terms of the abundance of resources in general.
4. RESULTS
4.1. In pictures. I divide the sample into percentiles of land quality and historic popu-
lation density. In Figure 4, I report the fraction of societies in each percentile that have
land rights. In Figure 5, I do the same for slavery. The raw correlations are as predicted.
Land rights are positively related to land quality and population density. Slavery is pos-
itively correlated with land quality, though this is weaker than the relationship for land
rights. In the model, the existence of multiple steady states helps explain this. Further,
slavery is most prevalent in societies with intermediate population densities.
4.2. Regressions. In Table 2, I report the results of estimating (5), (6) and (7). I report
marginal effects. For land quality, these can be interpreted as the effects of a one stan-
dard deviation improvement. When additional controls are added, the results suggest
that a one standard deviation improvement in land quality raises the probability that
land rights exist by roughly 4.6%. Interpreting the coefficient on population density as
an elasticity, a 1% increase in population density is associated with a 0.12% increase in
9I report results excluding absolute latitude in the web appendix. Results are similar without this con-
trol, though the quadratic term on population density becomes marginally insignificant in the slavery
equation.
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the chance that land rights exist.10 A one standard deviation increase in land quality pre-
dicts a 4.7% increase in the chance of slavery. The coefficients on the nonlinear function
of population density are not directly interpretable. The inverted-U probability profile
visible in Figure 5 is visible here. The level of historic population density at which slav-
ery peaks, (eβp1/(2βp2)), is 70 persons per square mile. This is between the 85th and the 90th
percentiles of the data.
5. ROBUSTNESS: WHAT THE MODEL CAN EXPLAIN
In this section, I show that the results are robust to several possible objections. First,
they can be replicated using alternative measures of land rights and slavery. The mea-
sures used for the dependent variables are correlated with alternatives from other sam-
ples too small to be used for replication. Second, similar results are obtained using dif-
ferent estimates of population density and land quality. Third, the results survive checks
for the importance of influential observations, for the endogeneity of land quality, and
for alternative clustering of standard errors. Fourth, while the data provide only limited
scope for testing the model against alternative explanations of land rights and slavery,
the model performs well against competing theories.
5.1. Alternative measures of the dependent variables. The measures of land rights
and slavery are coarse indicators. Land rights, in particular, exist for 74% of societies
in the data, but this does not distinguish how well defined these rights are. I show, first,
that the main measure is positively correlated with v1726 in the SCCS, an indicator for
whether land is mostly private. A full description of the SCCS variables and their coding
is given in the web appendix. Because v1726 is only available for 80 societies, I am not
able to replicate the econometric analysis with it. The results of regressing the existence
of land rights on v1726 are positive and significant, as reported in Table 3.
Next, I use an indicator for whether the inheritance of land is patrilineal as an alter-
native measure of land rights.11 Here, I follow Goody (1969, p. 65), who argues that:
[T]he scarcer productive resources become and the more intensively they
are used, then the greater the tendency towards the retention of these re-
sources within the basic productive and reproductive unit, which in the
large majority of cases is the nuclear family.
If land is scarce, it is an important consideration in marriage. This puts emphasis
on transmission of property from parents to children. Under patrilineal inheritance,
land may pass from a man to his son or his brother. Under matrilineal inheritance, land
necessarily passes out of the nuclear family to a man’s brother or to his sister’s son. I also
use an indicator for whether land is inherited by children as a more precise measure of
10This is a reasonable approximation, though not strictly correct, because the normalization is log(1+pop.
den.), not log(pop. den.).
11This is constructed using V74: Inheritance Rule for Real Property (Land). This is equal to 1 if V74=4,
V74=5, V74=6, or V74=7.
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the degree to which land is retained within the nuclear family.12 I show in Table 3 that
both of these are positively related to land quality and population density.
For slavery, I make similar tests. First, I show in Table 3 that the main measure of
slavery is correlated with an indicator constructed from v919 of the SCCS for the exis-
tence of large-scale slaveholding. I also show that the results can be mostly replicated
by constructing alternative measures of slavery from the Ethnographic Atlas. Slavery is
recorded as “absent” (1), “incipient or nonhereditary” (2) “reported but type not identi-
fied” (3), or “hereditary and socially significant” (4). I create a “slavery above incipient”
dummy for whether V 70 > 2, and a “hereditary slavery” dummy for V 70 = 4. The posi-
tive relationship between land quality and non-incipient slavery is still apparent, as are
the hump-shaped relationships with population density, though the link between land
quality and hereditary slavery is small and insignificant.
5.2. Alternative measures of land quality and population density. I validate the land
quality measure by showing that it is strongly correlated with three alternatives con-
tained in the SCCS – v921, v924 and v928. This is reported in Table 4.
I replicate the results with alternative proxies of population density. In Table 4, I show
that the main measure of population density is correlated with an indicator of land
shortage (v1720) from the SCCS. I also show that the main results can be replicated with
three alternative measures of population density – density in 1995, and densities com-
puted using McEvedy and Jones (1978) or ARVE estimates as in (8). If I do not weight
the regional densities, I find an inverse-U but insignificant relationship with slavery us-
ing the McEvedy and Jones (1978) estimates, and a significant inverse-U using the ARVE
data (not reported). If the principal measure of historical population density is replaced
for Canada and the United States with the estimates reported in Ruff (2006), the results
(not reported) are very similar to the baseline.
There are two variables in the SCCS (v64 and v1130) that create independent estimates
of the population densities of several societies in the data. These categorize the societies
into bins. While there are not enough observations to replicate the econometric analy-
sis, I show in Figure 6 that these alternative measures have inverse-U relationships with
slavery.
Any historical population density estimate is untrustworthy on its own. The measures
here agree that land rights have existed where population was densest, and that slavery
was most likely at intermediate values of population density. This is consistent with the
model and the “land abundance” view.
5.3. Other robustness checks. No sub-set of the data is determining the results. In the
web appendix, I list the ten most influential societies for each of the major coefficients
of interest. The societies that drive the relationships between land rights and the two
variables of interest are not concentrated in any one region.
12This is equal to 1 if V74=4, 5 or 7.
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In the web appendix, I show that removing statistical outliers or Europeans and their
offshoots has little effect on the results. If I remove both North and South America, the
results are unchanged excepting that the relationship between slavery and land quality
becomes small and insignificant. This is surprising, as slavery within the Americas was
most prominent in areas of the Pacific Northwest where agriculture was unimportant.
Excluding non-agricultural societies eliminates the relationship between land quality
and land rights, leaving other results unchanged. This highlights a mechanism by which
societies move from SE to SS, rather than providing evidence against the model.
I am not concerned with endogeneity of population density. The model expects that
population growth will respond to institutions, and I am only testing a correlation be-
tween two endogenous variables. I am, however, concerned about the endogeneity of
land quality. Soil depth and soil fertility may be potentially human-caused. In Table 5, I
address this by controlling directly for these components. The result survives separating
land quality into its separate parts. Baseline results are included for comparison.
Finally, I have reported heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. How sensitive is
the statistical inference to correlations in the errors within possible clusters of obser-
vations? I address this in the web appendix, clustering the standard errors by ethno-
graphic region (of which there are 60), by country, or by global region as classified by the
UN. The results are generally stable, though clustering by country pushes the p. values
of the population quadratic term to 0.15 in the slavery equation. The major exception
is that slavery is not significantly related to land quality if the results are made robust to
arbitrary correlation by country or by UN region. This foreshadows the results of Sec-
tion 6, suggesting that there are strong correlations in institutions within broad regions,
particularly for slavery. In the web appendix, I also adjust standard errors for spatial cor-
relation using the Conley (1999) logit model. Again foreshadowing the next section, the
relationship between slavery and population density becomes insignificant once spatial
correlations are accounted for. The other results of interest are robust to this correction.
5.4. Other theories of land rights. The two most influential theories of land rights are
those of Boserup (1965) and Demsetz (1967). Boserup (1965) argues that exogenous
population increase is the principal driver of agricultural intensification and more per-
manent tenure. This is the intuition captured by the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model. Other for-
malizations of this argument have captured these changes as the selection of produc-
tion technology in response to the relative scarcity of land and labor (e.g. Hayami (1997);
Quisumbing and Otsuka (2001)). The correlation of population density and land rights
supports this view. Further, this result supports the model against informal critiques
of Boserup (1965) that have argued that population pressure can lead to multiple out-
comes, including open access (e.g. Baland and Platteau (1998)).
These data do not, of course, allow the model to be tested against all possible mech-
anisms by which population density is positively correlated with the existence of rights
over land. Specific alternatives can be evaluated. It may be supposed, for example,
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that population density affects land rights only through the existence of states. Re-
estimating (6) separately for stateless societies and those with states, however, gives a
positive and significant coefficient on historic population density in both sub-samples
(not shown).
Demsetz (1967), by contrast, focuses on trade. He argues that land rights internalize
externalities when the gains outweigh the costs. This drives enclosure of the commons
in the formal treatments of Hotte et al. (2000) or Copeland and Taylor (2009), and ex-
plains the empirical results of Bogart and Richardson (2012). It is similar to the greater
effort expended in defending rights over more valuable resources predicted by models
of the economics of conflict (e.g. Baker (2003); Grossman and Kim (1995)). These are not
inconsistent with the land abundance view, and are incorporated into Austin’s (2008a)
account of it. The data do not include direct information on trade. The two controls
that best capture trade in the data – distance from the coast and access to a major river
– do not significantly predict the existence of land rights in Table 2.
Beyond these two influential theories, there is a literature on the enclosure of com-
mon property (e.g. Baland and Francois (2005); Baland and Platteau (2003); Grantham
(1980); Lueck (1994); Netting (1976); Ostrom (1991); Runge (1986)). These works identify
several benefits of common property that help explain why it survives. These include
scale economies, risk pooling, exclusion and effort costs, and equity concerns. None of
these explanations exclude land abundance as an explanation of weakly defined land
rights. Most of these variables are not available in the data, making it impossible to test
the land abundance view against them. The exception to this is risk. In Table 6, I add a
measure of ecological risk, including the coefficient of variation of annual rainfall over
the period 1950-1999.13 This does not diminish the direct effect of land quality.
5.5. Other theories of slavery. Several theoretical analyses of slavery and coercion exist
(e.g. Barzel (1977); Bergstrom (1971); Canarella and Tomaske (1975); Findlay (1975);
Genicot (2002)). Some, such as Conning (2004), formally capture the same intuition as
Nieboer (1900) or Domar (1970), which is the basis of the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model. In this
section, I contrast the results outlined in Section 4 with two other broad explanations of
slavery.
First, several theories emphasize coerced workers’ outside options. These include
what Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) refer to as the “neo-Malthusian” explanations of
the decline of serfdom. North and Thomas (1971), for example, hold that serfs volun-
tarily exchanged their labor for protection.14 Several models find that worse outside op-
tions for workers increase the degree of coercion in labor contracts (Beber and Blattman,
13Data here come from the University of Delaware Center for Climatic Research.
14Writers such as Inikori (1999) have suggested that African “slaves” held a position closer to that of the
European serf. In the model, slaves differ from free laborers in that they are coerced workers whose price
does not depend on the local supply of labor. The severity of slavery is not important to this conceptual
distinction.
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2011; Chwe, 1990).15 Similarly, Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) find that labor scarcity has
two effects, raising coercion through a Domar-type increase in the price of output, but
also reducing coercion by improving workers’ outside options.
If workers’ outside options help explain the existence of slavery, this does not rule out
labor scarcity as an explanation. Workers’ outside options are not directly observed in
the data, making it impossible to test the model against this explanation directly. Fol-
lowing the narrative of Nunn and Puga (2012), ruggedness is expected to improve the
outside option of slaves by making it easier for them to flee. Contrary to this intuition,
however, the marginal effect of ruggedness on slavery in Table 2 is positive.
There are four reasons North and Thomas (1971) cannot explain Africa. First, Fenoal-
tea (1975), demonstrates that they err in treating serfdom as voluntary, underestimate
the transactions costs in labor contracts, misidentify the historical trends that acted on
the manorial system, and overemphasize the rigidity of “custom.” Second, land qual-
ity and population density at low levels are positively associated with slavery. North
and Thomas (1971) predict these would promote the development of trade and mar-
kets, lessening the need for contracts to be written in labor dues. Third, their predic-
tion that trade will discourage the use of serfs runs counter to African history, in which
external trade spurred greater use of slaves in production (Law, 1995; Lovejoy, 2000).
Finally, there is no evidence that African slaves received payments that approximated
their marginal products. In many cases, slaveowners had to be compelled to receive
manumission payments.
The second set of theories I address argues that, in certain contexts, slavery is more
productive than free labor, which explains its use. For Fenoaltea (1984), this occurs
where “pain incentives” are effective and detailed care is unnecessary. Fogel and En-
german (1974) link the productivity of slaves in the American south to economies of
scale that could only be achieved through gang labor. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997),
similarly, argue that the cultivation of crops with economies of scale is more conducive
to slavery. Hanes (1996) explains the concentration of slaves in rural and domestic pro-
duction by invoking the high turnover costs in these industries.
These arguments again cannot alone explain slavery in Africa, even if they can ex-
plain it in other contexts. First, there is no evidence that slaves were used in production
in sectors systematically different than those dominated by free peasants. Studies of
slavery in individual African societies frequently make reference to slave labor and free
labor working in the same tasks. Austin (2005), for example, notes gold and kola pro-
duction in Asante were both carried out by free people, pawns, corve´e labor, slaves, and
descendants of slaves. Uchendu (1979) shows for Igbo society that “[i]n domestic ac-
tivities ... no operation was strictly reserved for slaves.” Second, the literature on the
15Naidu and Yuchtman (2011), by contrast, argue that British industrial workers committed to coercive
contracts in order to reduce wage variation.
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“legitimate commerce” period suggests that slaves were used in the activities where la-
bor of all kinds was most productive. Nineteenth century export markets created higher
returns to slave labor, and slavery within Africa intensified (Law, 1995; Lovejoy, 2000;
Lynn, 1997) Third, African agriculture both past and present has been overwhelmingly
characterized by diminishing or constant returns to scale (Hopkins, 1973). Without ev-
idence of scale economies, an appeal to “pain incentives” is not necessary to explain
slavery over and above a comparison of the costs of slavery to those of free labor.
The data only allow limited tests of the land abundance view against these arguments,
since economies of scale, turnover costs, or the detailed care needed in production are
not observed. The FAO does, however, report the suitability of land for eight classes
of rainfed crop – wheat, maize, cereals, roots/tubers, pulses, oil crops, sugar, and cot-
ton. I test whether including these measures in the slavery regressions has any effect
on the results. This tests the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model against the alternative that slavery
is explained by its productivity in the production of specific crops. I report the results
in Table 6. With one exception, none of these specific crops has a major impact on the
coefficient on land quality. The exception is maize suitability, which weakens the effect
of land quality, making it marginally insignificant. Since the main effect of maize is itself
insignificant and the two variables have a high raw correlation of 0.44, this is likely due
to multi-collinearity.
6. HETEROGENEITY: WHAT THE MODEL CANNOT EXPLAIN
In Table 7, I show a simple method to do away with the results presented so far: add
fixed effects for the major ethnographic regions in the data. These are North America,
South America, Africa, the Circum-Mediterranean, the Insular Pacific, and East Eurasia.
There is still a relationship between population density and land rights, and the mar-
ginal effect of land quality on slavery has not fallen by much, but the other results have
disappeared. The model can predict differences across regions, but not within them.
Why? Anthropologists have a name for the diffusion of institutions across societies:
“Galton’s problem.” Economists would call this serial correlation or spatial dependence.
I propose that the lack of robustness of the main results stems from these spillovers. If
a nearby society has slavery, it is almost impossible to avoid developing the institution
or becoming slaves, regardless of land quality and population density. The existence of
rights over land is an idea that can spread across societies, and can be used to defend
claims against a rival group. Within the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model, these make sense as
parameter shifts dependent on a neighboring group’s institutions. The cost of slavery
(γ), for example, should be lower if a slave who flees can only do so to another slave-
holding society.
In Table 8, I provide suggestive evidence that these neighbor effects exist by estimat-
ing spatial lag and spatial error models. The spatial lag adds a term ρWy to the esti-
mating equation. W is an N × N spatial weight matrix, in which each entry Wij is the
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inverse of the distance between observation i and observation j, normalized so that its
rows sum to 1 or 0. ρ captures whether the institutional outcome of one group will affect
its neighbor’s institutions. The reason this evidence is only suggestive is that ρ is not
separately identified from localized unobservables. This is estimated as a linear proba-
bility model using maximum likelihood.16 The spatial error model is similar. Now, the
error term is given by u = λWu + , so that a society’s error term may depend on the
error terms for societies that are close to it.
In Table 8, it is clear that there is very strong spatial correlation in land rights. The
Wald tests for ρ and λ are large, even conditional on the observed controls. Once con-
trols are added, none of the results concerning land quality survive. The results with
population density fare better, but for slavery these are only marginally significant in
the spatial lag model. These strong spatial correlations in institutional outcomes help
explain why the model can explain differences across regions, but not variation within
them.
I confirm the ability of the model to explain differences across regions in the web ap-
pendix. I show that the relationships between the averages of land quality and popula-
tion density within an ethnographic region are correlated with the fraction of societies
possessing land rights or slavery as the model predicts. The positive relationships of
land rights with both land quality and population density are still apparent, and the
inverse-U correlation between slavery and population density is still visible. Only the
correlation between slavery and land quality cannot be seen across regions in the data.
Once again, the existence of multiple steady states can explain this. In the web ap-
pendix, I report the regional means for these variables for the six major regions of the
Ethnographic Atlas.
7. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
It appears then, that, the land abundance view performs reasonably well in predict-
ing broad differences in the prevalence of land rights and slavery between Africa and
the rest of the world, though not as well at predicting outcomes within regions. What
of other institutions discussed by historians of Africa? The relative lack of state central-
ization and high rates of polygyny in Africa have also been tied to sparse population.
Rulers were unable to tie subjects to the land and tax them, sought subjects and cattle,
rather than territory, and had to contend with the ability of subjects to exit easily (Austin,
2004a,b). Goody (1976) argues that polygyny exists where allocating land to additional
wives is less costly but their labor is valuable.
In the web appendix, I replicate (5), (6) and (7) with states and polygamy as outcomes.
The prevalence of states in the global sample mimics that of rights over land, rising
16In particular, I use the spatreg command in Stata.
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monotonically with land quality and population density.17 Polygyny, by contrast, mim-
ics the pattern seen for slavery – its presence increases weakly with land quality, but
is strongest at intermediate levels of population.18 The relationships between polyg-
yny and the controls of interest are not robust to the inclusion of additional controls
– malaria ecology is sufficient to make either one insignificant. This suggests that the
land abundance view may have some power to explain the relative prevalence of states,
though its application to polygamy may be more limited.
Bad institutions are one of the fundamental causes of African poverty, and the institu-
tions that exist on the continent currently have been shaped by those that existed prior
to colonial rule. I have addressed a theme in the economics literature – how geogra-
phy affects institutions – by looking in depth at one hypothesis from the literature on
African history. I find that this perspective explains much about institutions across a
global cross-section of societies, but that neighbor effects weaken its ability to predict
differences within them.
These tests have made several points that must be taken into account in understand-
ing the impacts of under-population on African institutions. First, when both produc-
tivity and population are low, the opportunity cost of coercion is high, and the benefit
to creating estates is low. This explains why slavery is less common among the most
sparsely populated societies. Africa appears not as the least populous region in the sam-
ple, but as one that of medium density. While it is comparatively more prone to slavery
than Europe or South Asia, there the is more slavery on the continent than in many parts
of the Americas. Second, greater land quality (as well as access to trade), will encour-
age increased reliance on slavery conditional on population. This explains why some
of the most agriculturally prosperous though densely populated regions in Africa, such
as Sokoto, also used slaves most intensively. Finally, there are substantial institutional
spatial correlations across societies relating to land rights and slavery. These revisions
to the current thinking allow the “land abundance” perspective to better explain insti-
tutions and are borne out in comparative data.
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FIGURE 1. Institutional regions and dynamics
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FIGURE 2. Land rights and slavery
Land rights are on top, slavery on bottom. Black circles indicate presence, grey circles absence.
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FIGURE 3. Land quality and historic population density
Land quality is on top, population density on bottom. Darker colors indicate higher values; the ranges of
both are given in Table 1.
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FIGURE 4. Land rights by percentiles of land quality and hist. pop. density
The y axis is the percentage of societies with land rights. The top picture divides this by twenty percentiles
of land quality, each representing 5% of the sample. The bottom picture is divided by similar percentiles
of population density.
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FIGURE 5. Slavery by percentiles of land quality and hist. pop. density
The y axis is the percentage of societies with slavery. The top picture divides this into twenty percentiles
of land quality, each representing 5% of the sample. The bottom picture is divided by similar percentiles
of population density.
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FIGURE 6. Slavery by bins of population density in the SCCS
The y axis is the percentage of societies with slavery. The top picture divides this by population density
bins according to v64, while the bottom picture does so following v1130.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean s.d. Min Max N Pct.
5 0.02 0.05 0.29
Any slavery 0.54 0.50 0 1 1,040 10 0.09 0.17 0.59
Any land rights 0.74 0.44 0 1 801 15 0.26 0.28 1.21
Land quality 1.33 0.90 -4.0e-07 3.98 1,205 20 0.51 0.49 1.92
Date observed 1,905 53.1 1,500 1,965 1,205 25 1.21 0.88 2.58
Historic pop density 42.7 141 2.6e-07 3,627 1,205 30 2.39 1.96 3.79
Precipitation 1,262 855 12.6 6,164 1,205 35 3.70 3.86 5.07
Temperature 7,198 2,776 35.5 10,830 1,205 40 5.78 7.08 6.61
Absolute latitude 20.7 17.0 0.017 78.1 1,205 45 7.64 10.03 8.27
Pct. malarial 0.17 0.20 0 0.69 1,205 50 10.04 14.72 10.10
Dist. to coast 4.26 3.88 0 16.5 1,205 55 12.56 19.39 13.11
Elevation 167 9.60 141 230 1,205 60 15.78 24.39 17.33
Major river 0.28 0.45 0 1 1,205 65 20.14 32.31 22.56
Ruggedness 121,220 132,855 137 977,941 1,205 70 25.97 40.25 29.84
Share desert 0.11 0.26 0 1 1,205 75 35.17 55.00 39.13
Mostly fishing 0.069 0.25 0 1 1,205 80 47.25 76.05 53.36
85 62.98 105.86 71.90
90 95.85 151.97 115.18
95 162.79 246.17 197.82
Notes: Variable definitions in text.
Table 1: Summary statistics and percentiles of population density
HYDE 
Estimate MJ Base
ARVE 
Base
Land quality 0.091*** (0.017) 0.046*** (0.018)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.161*** (0.010) 0.122*** (0.011)
Precipitation -0.046** (0.021) -0.021 (0.021)
Temperature -0.027 (0.030) -0.056* (0.032)
Date observed 0.050*** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017)
Share desert 0.010 (0.018) 0.038** (0.016)
Dist. to coast -0.023 (0.018) 0.006 (0.018)
Elevation -0.006 (0.019) 0.004 (0.018)
Pct. malarial 0.174*** (0.026) 0.127*** (0.025)
Ruggedness 0.064*** (0.017) 0.030* (0.016)
Absolute latitude -0.106*** (0.033) -0.087** (0.037)
Major river -0.031 (0.034) -0.073** (0.035)
Mostly fishing -0.126* (0.074) 0.023 (0.071)
Observations
Land quality 0.040*** (0.015) 0.047** (0.021)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.288*** (0.029) 0.112*** (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.042*** (0.005) -0.013** (0.007)
Precipitation -0.062** (0.025) -0.046* (0.026)
Temperature 0.218*** (0.038) 0.216*** (0.038)
Date observed -0.049*** (0.019) -0.064*** (0.021)
Share desert 0.033 (0.022) 0.031 (0.020)
Dist. to coast 0.047** (0.023) 0.053** (0.024)
Elevation 0.015 (0.022) 0.016 (0.023)
Pct. malarial 0.388*** (0.030) 0.361*** (0.030)
Ruggedness 0.134*** (0.021) 0.119*** (0.022)
Absolute latitude 0.110*** (0.042) 0.136*** (0.043)
Major river 0.094** (0.042) 0.089** (0.042)
Mostly fishing 0.390*** (0.078) 0.419*** (0.081)
Observations
Pop. den. at peak slavery
(6) (7) (8)
Table 2. Main results
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions
are probit, with marginal effects reported.
Any land rights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any slavery
(5)
801 801 801 801
1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040
30.99 70.40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any land rights
Land mostly private (v1726 in SCCS) 0.301**
(0.144)
Land quality 0.049** 0.050**
(0.023) (0.022)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.120*** 0.180***
(0.015) (0.016)
Observations 80 801 801 801 801
Other cont. N Y Y Y Y
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Any slavery
Large scale slaveholding (v919 in SCCS) 0.538***
(0.166)
Land quality 0.037* 0.014
(0.021) (0.015)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.220*** 0.101***
(0.042) (0.029)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.027*** -0.011**
(0.007) (0.005)
Observations 166 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040
Other cont. N Y Y Y Y
Table 3: Alternative measures of the dependent variables
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with marginal
effects reported. Other controls are precipitation, temperature, date observed, share desert, distance from the coast, elevation, percentage malarial,
ruggedness, absolute latitude, major river, and mostly fishing.
Land is patrilineal Lnd. inherit. by children
Slavery above incipient Hereditary slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land 
quality 
(v921)
Land 
quality 
(v924)
Land 
quality 
(v928)
Land 
scarcity 
(v1720)
Land quality 1.677*** 0.703*** 0.871***
(0.254) (0.112) (0.107)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.080***
(0.030)
Observations 172 172 172 79
R-squared 0.223 0.196 0.274
Other cont. N N N N
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln pop density 1995 0.096*** 0.127***
(0.010) (0.046)
     squared. -0.013**
(0.006)
ln(1 + pop. den.) - MJ Base 0.122*** 0.125***
(0.011) (0.040)
     squared. -0.012*
(0.007)
ln(1 + pop. den.) - ARVE Base 0.122*** 0.112***
(0.011) (0.038)
     squared. -0.013**
(0.007)
Observations 801 801 801 1,040 1,040 1,040
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions are probit, excepting columns 1-3, with marginal effects reported. Columns 1-3 are OLS. Other
controls are precipitation, temperature, date observed, share desert, distance from the coast, elevation,
percentage malarial, ruggedness, absolute latitude, major river, and mostly fishing.
Table 4: Alternative measures of land quality and population density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Land quality 0.046*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.047** 0.061*** 0.085***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.027)
Soil depth constraints 0.092*** 0.050**
(0.018) (0.021)
Soil fertility constraints 0.019 0.075***
(0.018) (0.026)
Observations 801 801 801 1,040 1,040 1,040
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 5: Possible endogeneity of land quality
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other controls are precipitation, temperature, date
observed, share desert, distance from the coast, elevation, percentage malarial, ruggedness, absolute
latitude, major river, and mostly fishing.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land quality 0.079*** 0.045**
(0.017) (0.018)
Rainfall CV -0.315** 0.041 -0.116 0.019
(0.143) (0.114) (0.138) (0.139)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.162*** 0.122***
(0.010) (0.012)
Observations 801 801 801 801
Other cont. N N Y Y
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Other crop Wheat Maize Cereals 
Roots/ 
tubers Pulses Oil crops Sugar Cotton 
Land quality 0.041* 0.036 0.048** 0.056*** 0.039* 0.071*** 0.049** 0.042*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
Other crop suitability 0.013 0.037 -0.002 -0.042* 0.032 -0.074*** -0.030 0.042*
(0.021) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 0.108*** 0.126*** 0.114*** 0.113***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.013* -0.013* -0.013** -0.013** -0.013* -0.015** -0.013** -0.014**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Other crop suitability 0.009 0.036 0.006 -0.039 0.032 -0.059** -0.035 0.048*
(0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Observations 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040
Other cont. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Corr(Land  qual., suit.) 0.36 0.44 0.49 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.21 0.30
Any slavery
Table 6: Alternative theories
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with
marginal effects reported. Other controls are precipitation, temperature, date observed, share desert, distance from the coast, elevation,
percentage malarial, ruggedness, absolute latitude, major river, and mostly fishing.
Any land rights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land quality 0.014 0.037
(0.018) (0.023)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.100*** 0.022
(0.013) (0.042)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.006
(0.007)
Observations 801 801 1,040 1,040
Other cont. Y Y Y Y
Table 7: Results with region fixed effects
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. All regressions are probit, with marginal effects reported. Other
controls are precipitation, temperature, date observed, share desert, distance from the
coast, elevation, percentage malarial, ruggedness, absolute latitude, major river, and
mostly fishing.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spatial error model
Land quality 0.031** 0.017 0.007 0.016
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.051*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.029) (0.030)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.018*** -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)
Wald test (λ=0) 698.6 364.0 526.8 211.4 1632 1634 730.3 744.8
Observations 801 801 801 801 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Spatial lag model
Land quality 0.028** 0.016 0.012 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
ln(1+pop. den.) 0.068*** 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.035
(0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.027)
ln(1+pop. den.) sqrd. -0.014*** -0.007
(0.004) (0.005)
Wald test (ρ=0) 593.4 176.8 189.1 68.39 1592 1096 254.5 260.3
Observations 801 801 801 801 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040
Other cont. N N Y Y N N Y Y
Table 8: Galton's problem
Any land rights Any slavery
Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions
are linear probability models. Other controls are precipitation, temperature, date observed, share desert, distance from the
coast, elevation, percentage malarial, ruggedness, absolute latitude, major river, and mostly fishing.
Any land rights Any slavery
